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Abstract: The creation of ICANN was sought by the United States
government to promote international cooperation in the governance
of the Internet based on a bottom-up system in which government
intervention was limited, if not eliminated. However, as the Internet
has become a global phenomenon, this initiative has faced increasing
opposition from the international community. As we have shown in
this article, the evolution of ICANN reveals how it slowly departed
from its mere technical role into a more political one, in which all
groups and constituencies try to impose their preferences. During the
reform movement initiated from inside ICANN, different
constituencies tried to exploit the situation by gaining power positions
in the new structure. The political strength of different groups and
constituencies reversed some of the initial reforms and produced a
totally new structure. Reform attempts from inside ICANN were
challenged by the international community. These efforts
concentrated on changing the main structure of ICANN into a
multilateral organization controlled by international governments and
removing the direct control of ICANN from the United States
government. In the end, even though the proposals seem to look for
different structures to regulate domain names and numbers on the
Internet, they represent a political struggle between opposite points of
view.
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First, the inside-out reform analysis allowed us to examine the
political strength of its different constituencies. This process also
showed how ICANN has become more of a political instrument,
instead of a technical corporation. An indication of this is that most of
the debate on the reform was based on how to divide the power inside
ICANN, more specifically inside the Board of Directors, and how to
maximize the capacity of each group to enforce their policies.
Second, our analysis shows how the inside-out reforms sought to
enhance international cooperation. Creating a Supporting
Organization for the ccNSO and the incentives for international
governments to participate in a better CGA opened the ICANN gates
to more extensive international participation in policymaking.
However, the international community did not respond adequately to
the reform and tried to generate its own model for Internet
Governance.
The response of the International community to the regulatory
regime of ICANN was the creation of a new organization with
international ties and controlled by governments. This proposal, as
summarized in the WGIG report, sought to overhaul ICANN and to
take away the United States' direct control of ICANN and the
management of names and numbers on the Internet. As a result, we
face a struggle between two different types of regulation, a bottom-up
approach, with more participation from the private sector, and a top-
down approach which intends to take Internet governance into the
international arena.
As shown in this article, Internet governance has become a hot
political issue, and the organizations in charge of managing the
regulatory regime will reflect these political preferences. The
effectiveness of any of these governance regimes will depend on how
well the specific structure of power provides an opportunity for
consensus. In the end, the reform and the political struggle behind it
have unmasked the political nature of ICANN. As a result, its future
will depend on the consensus of its constituents and on the struggle
between state and private sectors. In this debate, the United States
government is one of the only governments defending ICANN in its
current structure because of the contract that ties ICANN directly to
the U.S. Department of Commerce. On the other hand, the
international community is pushing the U.S. to hand over its sole
control of ICANN.
Given the tension between both parties, we believe that this
transition could move forward through the creation of a supranational
entity in charge, not just of ICANN's responsibilities, but also of other
areas related to the Internet, i.e., e-commerce and Internet security.
We call this organization the World Internet Governance Organization
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("WIGO"), managed by a board representing the developed countries
and the technical groups with a stake in the Internet. This would
entail an institution organized somewhere in between the unilateral
regime represented by ICANN and the multilateral approach proposed
by the United Nations. WIGO would allow both parties to obtain some
of their objectives. The U.S. would retain some power in designing the
system, while other developed and developing countries would have
more say in the direction of the system. A well-thought proposal that
considers the foremost needs of the Internet will have a greater chance
of succeeding than individual attempts to overtake the governance of
the Internet. Furthermore, it will generate a point of convergence for
the diverse preferences of international stakeholders. Nonetheless,
the success of such a proposal requires countries to realize that
unorganized or individual attempts to regulate will not carry the day.
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I. INTRODUCrION
The Internet has been portrayed as a place without government
intervention or regulation., In this new environment, Internet users
have proudly relied on their own regulating abilities.2 Businesses
maintain that self-regulation has worked for the Internet and that
government intervention remains unnecessary. The lack of
government intervention was a good signal for some, but bad for
others.3 However, the absence of traditional politics did not mean
that governance was not needed.4 Many private organizations and
providers came together to control and regulate the Internet through
code, i.e., technical definitions.5 In this article we explain that ICANN,
and more extensively the issue of Internet governance, has become a
political issue in which different national governments and
constituencies have a stake. Due to the politically-charged context
1 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX. L. REV. 447, 447 (2000) (reviewing
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)).
2 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). See also Paul
Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying
Constitutional Norms to "Private"Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1263 (2000) (providing
an analysis of this type of regulation).
3 See Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1203 (2000) (analyzing the government's attempts to regulate the Internet). Benkler
conducted a survey of "all bills introduced in the United States Congress and all public laws
passed by Congress and signed by the President, which use the terms 'internet,' 'electronic
commerce,' 'e-commerce,' 'world wide web,' or 'interactive' close to 'computer' or 'online.'"
Id. at 12o6. He found that "[t]here were 15 such bills and joint resolutions in the lOlst
Congress, 23 in the 102d Congress, 34 in the 103d Congress, 66 in the 1o4th Congress, 275
in the 105th Congress, and 348 introduced in the first session of the io6th Congress, for a
total of 761." Id. at 12o6-07. See generally Charles L. Kerr & Oliver Metzger, Online
Privacy: Changing Exceptions-Changing Rules, 632 PLI/PAT 147 (2001); Mike Hatch,
The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal Information from
Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457 (2001); Bill
Luther, A Commentary on the State of Online Privacy and the Efficacy of Self-Regulation,
27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 2125 (2001); Thomas B. Nachbar, Paradox and Structure:
Relying on Government Regulation to Preserve the Internet's Unregulated Character, 85
MINN. L. REv. 215 (2000).
4 See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Optimizing Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 72
U. CIN. L. REV. 1497 (2004).
5 See Lawrence Lessig, The Constitution of Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques
of Cyberspace, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 181 (1997). See also LESSIG, supra note 2.
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surrounding Internet governance it becomes necessary to look for a
system that reflects the preferences of stake holders instead of one
that purely promotes the best technical design.
In 1998, a new corporation was created to manage the addresses
and numbers of the Internet: the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ("ICANN"). 6 This non-profit organization was
designed to manage the system from a technical point of view, without
government intervention or political influence.7 In accord with the
intentions of its creators, particularly the United States government,
ICANN represented the paradigm of bottom-up regulation, in which
the private sector could design its own rules without the interference
of politicians.8  However, after only three years, the rapid
internationalization of the Internet led to proposals for changing
ICANN's governance structure. As we show in this article, ICANN was
involved in a political process since its creation, despite assertions to
the contrary.
In 2002, the President of ICANN introduced a reform proposal
arguing that ICANN could not perform its regulatory role without
cooperation from the United States and other national governments. 9
Throughout 2002 and 2003, the different stakeholders in ICANN
debated the type and extent of this reform.1° However, many of
ICANN's constituencies have tried to avoid involving national
governments, in direct opposition to the President's proposal. 1' As we
demonstrate in this article, the reform process, and its result, revealed
the political nature of ICANN as opposed to the intended technical
nature of the organization. However, ICANN was not widely accepted.
International actors, more importantly the United Nations through its
6 see MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF
CYBERSPACE (2002). See also MILTON MUELLER, CONVERGENCE CENTER, SUCCESS BY
DEFAULT: A NEW PROFILE OF DOMAIN NAME TRADEMARK DISPUTES UNDER ICANN's UDRP
(2002).
7 Management of Internet Names and Numbers, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741-01 (Jun. lo, 1998),
available at http://www.icann.org/general/white-paper-o5jun98.htm.
aId.
9 See M. STUART LYNN, PRESIDENT'S REPORT: ICANN-THE CASE FOR REFORM (2002),
http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24febo2.htm.
10 See generally ICANN, Links Concerning ICANN's 2002 Evolution and Reform Process,
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/links.htm (last visited April 5, 2008).
11 See infra Sections III to V.
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International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"), rejected the
organization of ICANN. As ICANN underwent this reform process,
the United Nations tried to create a different model of Internet
governance, shifting control away from the United States in favor of
the UN and restructuring ICANN as a multilateral organization via
outside-in reform. As a result, we are in the midst of a political
struggle targeting ICANN to define the governance regime for the
Internet.12
In this article, we analyze how the interests of economic groups,
countries, and users gave rise to the different governance proposals by
employing the framework of political economy; this perspective
allows us to model different actors' preferences and reflect how these
preferences play a role in creating and modifying governance
institutions. In this framework, each group holds a certain set of
preferences for ICANN governance that favors its own interests.
These interests may conflict with the most efficient management of
ICANN. Allowing one nation to manage ICANN exacerbates this
problem in the eyes of the international community. Rather than
seeing ICANN as organized to ensure its efficacy, we shall see that it is
in fact structured according to the interests of the most powerful
groups within ICANN.
To do this, we use a simple preferences model to understand
where each group stands, and we analyze how the success or failure of
reform is based on such preferences. The issue of Internet governance
has become a political issue in which constituencies' strength and
preferences will shape the kind of institution in charge of managing
the Internet domain names. The conflicted visions regarding the
preferred structure of ICANN have led to a policy stalemate between
the United States, the United Nations and the other international
organizations that could potentially take control of ICANN. As we
propose, a possible solution to this problem is the creation of an
organization, similar to the WTO, which we call WIGO. This
organization should retain the technical ability of ICANN to control
the names and addresses of Internet, but allow for further
participation from the international community.
In Section II, we present background regarding ICANN and the
Uniform Domain Resolution Policy ("UDRP"). In Section III, we
describe the initial characteristics of ICANN's structure at its
inception in 1998. In Section IV, we present a model of the
preferences of the groups holding a stake in Internet regulation. In
12 Tamar Frankel, Governing by Negotiation: The Internet Naming System, 12 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 449,452 (2004).
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Section V, we present the reform proposal presented by ICANN's
President and analyze the effects it would have had on the
constituencies' distribution of political power. In Section VI, we
analyze the attempts of the international community to take over
ICANN from the United States and replace it with an international
organization. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section VII.
Among them, we demonstrate that even though many observers
criticized the ICAAN reform from a normative point of view, this
reform was the one that was politically feasible. Given the political
persuasion of those groups that maintained or increased their power,
the reform is far from an efficient one. ICANN was not instituted
based on an objective measure of efficiency, but rather to maintain the
power of stakeholders already in place. Furthermore, we show how
far ICANN is from being a representative organization in the
management of the Internet by detailing the outcry of the
international community, the extreme reforms proposed by the
Working Group on Internet Governance ("WGIG"), and the heated
debate during the last World Summit on the Information Society
("WSIS"). Finally, we propose a mixed institution that retains some of
the technical aspects of ICANN but gains legitimacy across
constituencies in Section VII.
II. ICANN IN THE LITERATURE
ICANN has been the focus of numerous studies. Its creation
signaled a style of regulation unique to the Internet environment. As
Jonathan Zittrain explains:
ICANN has inherited an extraordinarily difficult situation,
with high expectations all around, and with almost no
discretionary room to move. The set of realistic options for
substantive policy making and procedural structure is quite
small. For better or worse, ICANN faces swift dispatch if it
strays too far from the desires of any of the mainstream
Internet technical community, the United States and other
governments (including executive, legislative, and judicial
branches, which in turn may not agree) and powerful
corporate interests. Indeed, those representing the "little
guy" and/or those wanting a maximally unregulated Net-
one where political concerns have no place in technical
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management-are quick to worry about capture of ICANN by
one or another of these powerful interests. 13
The special characteristics of ICANN, combined with the existence
of many different stakeholders, generated an intense debate on issues
of Internet regulation. Critics argued for and supporters of the new
system argued against the reform of ICANN. This debate involved all
of the areas managed by ICANN. Among them, the Uniform Domain
Resolution Policy ("UDRP") occupied a central role because it became
ICANN's preferred instrument to enforce domain name contracts with
Internet users. As a result of this policy, ICANN became both the de-
facto and the de-jure regulator of Internet domain names and
numbers, according to its contract with the Department of Commerce.
This Section discusses the usual approaches to studying ICANN and
explains how this article provides a new and useful analysis of its
development.
A. ICANN LEGITIMACY
One of the main debates regarding the formation of ICANN was
the question of whether the Department of Commerce had the
authority to delegate Internet governance to a private, nonprofit
organization. First, some researchers argued that the United States
government, which found itself in control of the Domain Name
System ("DNS") and its regulation, 14 could not delegate the
management of the DNS to a private institution without
Congressional approval 15 As Michael Froomkin argued, delegating a
government regulatory function to a private organization could be
considered unconstitutional.16 Froomkin stated that giving regulatory
power to a non-profit organization meant relinquishing government
sovereignty and delegating the federal government's Constitutional
powers to a non-governmental entity.17 Furthermore, as Froomkin
13 Jonathan Zittrain, ICANN: Between the Public and the Private Comments before
Congress, 14 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 1071,1091 (1999).
14 Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route around the APA






observed, granting regulatory power to a private institution that has a
stake in the issue to be regulated can create arbitrariness, lack of due
process, and self-dealing; all of which also raise constitutional
concerns. 18 As a solution to these conflicts of interest, Froomkin
proposed a new system in which ICANN would be limited to handling
technical functions, while the United States government would retain
political control over the DNS. 19 To avoid international complaints,
the United States government would share political control with a
small group of foreign representatives and Internet constituents.20
Nonetheless, Froomkin's advice remained unheeded.
The debate regarding the constitutionality of ICANN continued,
and support for the Department of Commerce decision quickly
appeared. Kathleen Fuller argued that even though Froomkin's
arguments were convincing, they could be circumvented. Therefore,
the contract with ICANN could remain in place.21 Furthermore, Jose
Sims and Cynthia Bauerly discredited Froomkin's claims on the basis
of faulty legal interpretation and insufficient knowledge of the origins
of the Internet and the DNS.22 This debate continued with Froomkin
and Mark Lemley arguing that ICANN and its policies, which
monopolize the DNS, violate United States antitrust law.23
Nevertheless, Lily Blue argued, there is little room to charge ICANN
with antitrust violations, as ICANN policies do not create a monopoly
and are necessary to sustain the Internet.24 In this respect, several
authors supported ICANN as necessary to provide important
standards and regulations for the Internet.25
18 Id. at 146.
'9 Id. at 171.
20 Id. at 14 at 178-79.
21 Kathleen Fuller, ICANN: The Debate Over Governing the Internet, 2001 DuKE L. &
TECH. REV. 0002 (2001).
22 Joe Sims & Cynthia Bauerly, A Response to Professor Froomkin: Why ICANN Does Not
Violate the APA or the Constitution, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BuS. L. 65, 68-70 (2002).
23 Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANNandAntitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 74-
75 (2003).
24 Lily Blue, Internet and Domain Name Governance: Antitrust Litigation, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 387,403 (2004).
25 Jose MA. Emmanuel A. Caral, Lessons from ICA.N: Is Self-Regulation of the Internet
Fundamentally Flawed?, 12 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH 1, 30-31 (2004).
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A second issue that has come under scrutiny is the manner in
which ICANN decides its regulations and norms. That is, what are the
bases for legitimacy and consensus within ICANN?26 This issue is
closely related to the way in which the United States government
delegated regulatory function to ICANN. Jonathan Weinberg argues
that ICANN has tried to pursue legitimacy under the same principles
as other federal government agencies: representation and consensus.27
However, Weinberg maintains that ICANN cannot obtain legitimacy
and form consensus under any of these bases.28 As a result, ICANN
should narrow the scope of its policies to minimize its intervention in
an environment that does not welcome it.29 Furthermore, many
critics complain that ICANN's decisions are far from democratic
because democratic institutions, such as Congress, international
organizations, foreign national governments, or Internet users, have
no role in ICANN governance.30 As a result, under this view,
consumers and citizens have no say in the specific design of Internet
regulation. Nonetheless, Dan Hunter argues that the legitimacy
problem lies not in the nature of ICANN, but in our understanding of
democracy.3l He maintains that ICANN critics put too much
emphasis on an ideal definition of democracy, which is not
representative of the reality we face on the Internet.32 Even so,
ICANN should try to pursue political commitments among different
Internet stakeholders in order to improve its performance.33
The debate on legitimacy, democracy, representation, and
consensus continues within ICANN and has led to the reform process
we analyze in this article. On one hand, John Palfrey claims that
ICANN failed to bring democracy to the Internet and that it should be
26 Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DuKE L.J. 187,212-13
(2000).
27 Id. at 258-59.
28M.
29 Id. at 260.
30 Id.; Froomkin, supra note 14, at page 167.
31 See Dan Hunter, ICANN and the Concept of Democratic Deficit, 36 LoY. L.A.L. REV.
1149 (2003).
32 Id. at 1153.
33 Id. at l18l.
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reformed accordingly.34 On the other, Susan Crawford argues that
democratic online representation is impossible.35 As a result, we can
justify the reliance of ICANN on a consensus model.36 However,
Crawford decries the reform efforts of 2002 because they failed to
bring about constructive reform.37 David Johnson, David Post, and
Crawford agree that the ICANN reform led to a more centralized, top-
down, regime for Internet regulation.38
Due to globalization of the Internet, advocates of the democratic
and consensus approach support opening ICANN to other national
national governments, especially through the United Nations.39
According to this view, the United States government should
relinquish its control of ICANN to the United Nations, which should
then create a new international organization to regulate the Internet.40
In fact, several proposals have been suggested; in the policy arena, the
International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"), which sought for
itself a role as the natural forum for Internet policy, became the main
supporter of this international approach and has confronted ICANN
since its inception with competing proposals for Internet
governance. 41 The most recent proposals came from the World
Summit on the Information Society ("WSIS") and the Working Group
on Internet Governance ("WGIG").42 Despite these international
34 John Palfrey, The End of the Experiment: How ICANN's Foray Into Global Democracy
Failed, 17 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 409,411-12 (2004).
3s Susan P. Crawford, The ICANNExperiment, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 409,447
(2004).
36 Id. at 446.
37 See Sims & Baverly, supra note 22, at 65.
38 David R. Johnson, David Post & Susan P. Crawford, A Commentary on the ICANN
"Blueprint"for Evolution and Reform, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1127,1127-28 (2003). See
Michael Froomkin, ICANN 2.0: Meet the New Boss, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REv. io87 (analyzing a
series of studies that show how ICANN reform reduced the participation of Internet users
and constituencies).
39 Reece Roman, What ifICANN Can't?: Can the United Nations Really Save the
Internet?, 2006 SYRACUSE SC. & TECH. L. REP. 6,7 (2006).
40 Id.
41 See Kim G. von Arx, ICANN-Now and Then: ICANN's Reform and its Problems, 2003
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0007 (2003).
42 See Working Group on Internet Governance, http://www.wgig.org.
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efforts, as we will analyze below, ICANN continues to maintain control
of names and numbers. Nevertheless, the heated debate concerning
the legitimacy and structure of ICANN and the role of the United
States continues.
B. ICANN UDRP: ATTEMPTING GLOBAL REGULATION
The Uniform Domain Resolution Policy is one of the main policies
ICANN implemented to regulate complaints among domain name
owners and, as such, it has been subject to deep scrutiny.43 This
dispute resolution system for domain name owners is the first
ambitious attempt to generate a regulatory system for the Internet.
Many studies have focused on the performance of this regime, trying
to ascertain whether the system provides adequate redress for
Internet users and businesses around the world. Many of the findings
of these studies have undermined the legitimacy of the UDRP and
have cast suspicion on the ability of ICANN to produce effective and
unbiased regulations.44 John White argues that the UDRP is a good
way to combat cybersquatting, but warns that it should be flexible in
order to consider specific situations.45
Only one year after its implementation, Robert Badgley suggested
that the poor quality of decisions was linked to problems in the UDRP
design and not to bad arbitrators.46 Badgley proposed a series of
reforms needed to improve UDRP's efficiency.47 After these initial
reactions, which proposed reforms to improve UDRP performance,
different studies became more critical of the regulatory regime. For
instance, David Sorkin argued that United States courts should not
rely on the decisions reached by the UDRP system, given the problems
43 Froomkin, supra note 14, at 25.
44 Luke Walker, ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 289,303-304 (2000).
45 John White, ICAN1Ws Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy in Action, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 229 (20Ol); Gillian Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons
from ICANN, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 257 (2002).
46 Robert Badgley, Improving ICANN in Ten Easy Steps: Ten Suggestions for ICANN to





with its procedure.48 Conversely, Katherine Meyers argued that the
courts should give UDRP the same treatment they give federal
agencies.49 Froomkin offered a more dire diagnosis, as he criticized
ICANN for privatizing and internationalizing trademark law and
creating an artificial, centralized system for managing DNS, which
eliminated the ability of other possible instruments for conflict
resolution regulation.5o In the same fashion as the other researchers,
Froomkin also offered a list of possible solutions for the UDRP.51
Elizabeth Thornburg, likewise, criticized the UDRP for offering a
limited arbitration policy that lacks the basic characteristics necessary
for an adequate regime.52 Notably, Michael Geist provided the first
statistical analysis of ICANN's arbitration system and found
differences in decisions when the panel is composed of three
arbitrators, and a bias within UDRP caseload allocation, which
provides a strong incentive for forum shopping.53 We also provided
further empirical evidence on the problems of forum shopping by
complainants and performance differences across UDRP providers.54
As a consequence, the questions regarding the legitimacy of ICANN
have been transferred to the UDRP, and the criticism has grown
because of technical problems in the arbitration process.
48 David Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute Decisions, 18 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L. J. 35,46-47 (2001). See Nilanjana Chatterjee,
Arbitration Proceedings Under ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy-Myth or Reality?, 10 VINDOBONA J. OF INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 67 (2OO6). See also
Richard E. Speidel, ICANN Domain Name Dispute Resolution, The Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act, and the Limitations of Modern Arbitration Law, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 167 (2002).
49 Katherine Meyers, Domain Name Dispute Resolution in U.S. Courts: Should ICAT1N be
Given Deference?, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1177,1199 (2002).
50 Michael Froomkin, ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy-Causes and (Partial)
Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 605,612 (2002).
51 See id.
52 Elizabeth Thornburg, Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control: Lessons From the ICANN
Dispute Resolution Process, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 191 (2002).
53 Michael Geist, Fair.com? An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in
the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 903, 936 (2002).
54 Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Market for Private Dispute Resolution Services-An
Empirical Re-assessment of ICANN-UDRP Performance, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L.
REv. 285,368-69 (2005).
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Despite these debates on the legitimacy and performance of
ICANN, no one has analyzed the political evolution of ICANN as an
endogenous process of change. Different studies analyzed ICANN and
its alternatives as static, feasible versions for Internet regulation.
These normative proposals have been based on ideal models of
optimal regulatory regimes, without taking into account the limits and
opportunities offered by the ICANN experience. These different
visions regarding regulation confront three different Internet
constituencies: Internet users-early developers and Internet
libertarians-who oppose proprietary interests and government
intervention; defenders of the United States' role as the sole source of
regulatory power; and those who favor a multi-country, decentralized
approach based on the United Nations model for Internet governance.
In addition, these debates on regulatory structure fail to explain how
these differing positions have created a dynamic process of political
change. ICANN, despite its dependence on the United States
government, is not isolated from the political pressure of other
countries or other Internet constituencies.
This article shows how this debate has led to changes in the
internal political structure of ICANN as well as induced external
attempts to create an organization that would provide a more diverse
model for Internet regulation. As a result, this article provides an
analytical framework to understand changes in ICANN, and the
possible future evolutions of its political structure. To understand this
process, it is imperative to explain how Internet regulation will change
over time, and the challenges and opportunities inherent in creating a
global regulatory framework.
III. POLITICAL EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF ICANN
Since its inception, ICANN has experienced a number of structural
changes.55 Most of the changes that took place between 2002 and
ICANN's creation in 1998 were intended to provide a governance
structure inside ICANN, which allowed the participation of different
groups and constituencies in the policymaking process.56
s5 See ICANN, Bylaws Archive, http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/ (last visited
April 5, 2oo8) (providing a complete evolution of the bylaws that regulated the
policymaking process of ICANN). See also Frankel, supra note 12, at 457.
56 See Frankel, supra note 12, at 457.
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At its inception, ICANN had an Initial Board in charge of
management and policymaking.57 The Board was composed of nine
members from the at-large constituency of ICANN with the authority
to manage and develop its main structure.58
In its first bylaws, enacted by the Initial Board, the ICANN
structure included a Board of Directors in charge of all decisions and
three supporting organizations, containing the main constituencies
with a focus on the activities of ICANN (Figure 1).59 According to the
bylaws, the ICANN Board consisted of nineteen directors elected by
the supporting organizations (three each) and by the at-large
members (nine) of ICANN. 60 This structure also provided for three
advisory committees 61 to help the Board in the policymaking
process. 62 The initial bylaws did not define a specific composition for
57 See Management of Internet Names and Numbers, supra note 7.
58 See ICANN, Bylaws, Nov. 6 1998, Art. IV, § 1(a), http://www.icann.org/general/archive-
bylaws/bylaws-o6nov98.htm.
59 See id.
60 See id., Art. V, §§ 3, 4.
61 See id., Art. VII, § 3. The three Advisory Committees were: the Government Advisory
Committee ("GAC"), composed by international governments, multinational governmental
organizations and treaty organizations; the DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee
("RSSAC'), composed by the organizations responsible for the operation of the world's
thirteen root name servers and other organizations related to the root server system; and
the Advisory Committee on Membership ("ACM") with members appointed by the Board
(temporary committee).
62 According to the bylaws, the role of each Committee was:
The GAC:
should consider and provide advice on the activities of the Corporation
as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where
there may be an interaction between the Corporation's policies and
various laws, and international agreements. The Board will notify the
chairman of the Governmental Advisory Committee of any proposal for
which it seeks comments under Article III, Section 3(b) and will
consider any response to that notification prior to taking action.
Id., Art. VII, § 3(a).
The RSSAC:
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the different supporting organizations, but rather left this task open to
future reviews by the Board of Directors upon consultation with
specific groups and constituencies. 63 As a consequence, even though
the structure of ICANN was subject to further reform, the power
inside ICANN was divided among private constituencies-the
members of each supporting organization-with an interest in
developing the Internet.
Having endured many changes in its first two years, the governing
structure of ICANN was almost complete by the beginning of 2000
(Figure 2). Nonetheless, ICANN's performance during 2001 left many
people wondering if this particular structure was working properly.64
Since then, many reforms have been proposed, and a global debate
has arisen regarding how ICANN should be structured and what
regulatory power it should have. In the next Section, we analyze the
different proposals and how the preferences of different actors have a
role in shaping the direction of the reforms.
The responsibility of the Root Server System Advisory Committee shall
be to advise the Board about the operation of the root name servers of
the domain name system. The Root Server System Advisory Committee
should consider and provide advice on the operational requirements of
root name servers, including host hardware capacities, operating
systems and name server software versions, network connectivity and
physical environment. The Root Server System Advisory Committee
should examine and advise on the security aspects of the root name
server system. Further, the Root Server System Advisory Committee
should review the number, location, and distribution of root name
servers considering the total system performance, robustness, and
reliability.
Id. Art. VII, § 3(b).
The ACM: "The responsibility of the Advisory Committee on
Membership shall be to advise the Board on the creation of the
membership structure called for in Section 9(c) of Article V [At-Large
members]."
Id. Art. VII, § 3(c).
63 See id. Art. VI: Supporting Organizations.
64 The source of such concerns is evident in light of the reform proposal submitted by
ICANN's President.
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Figure 1. Initial Structure of ICANN
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Figure 2. ICANN Structure Year 2001
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IV. MODELING PREFERENCES
In order to analyze the various proposed reforms to ICANN and
the reaction of the many constituencies represented (and even those
not represented) in ICANN's Board, we present a model that spatially
represents preferences. This model helps to demonstrate the stake
economic groups and countries have in ICANN, and the political
nature of this process. Since the creation of ICANN, the private sector
has had the advantage of defining regulation according to its economic
interests in the Internet. Nonetheless, the growing influence of
Internet users as well as other countries has led them to challenge the
private control of ICANN. 65
As the Internet grows, more actors will appear and will try to
influence the decision-making process of ICANN. We assume that
there are two main dimensions that define the main characteristics of
a governance institution such as ICANN. On one hand, since the
creation of ICANN, the debate has been whether this organization
should be controlled by the private sector or the government. For
example, the U.S. government attempted to give more control to the
private sector while the ITU proposed an organization more directly
controlled by state governments. Yet, since the early times of the
Internet, users have proposed a system of direct participation, instead
of an organization that responds directly to private interests or
national governments. An example of this is the fact that the initial
structure of ICANN allowed the selection of some Directors through
direct elections by Internet users. As a result, we assume that most of
the differences in preferences among the groups concern these two
issues: the level of government involvement in ICANN and the means
of representation (i.e., direct votes or delegates).
The system for governing the Internet can be based on a bottom-
up or a top-down approach. Since its inception, decision-making in
ICANN has followed a bottom-up approach, and this method was
defended by most of the constituencies represented on the Board of
Directors. The top-down approach to decision-making has not been
fully applied to the Internet, because national governments (with the
exception of the United States) do not have much input regarding
ICANN regulations. On the other hand, Internet users proposed a
more decentralized bottom-up system, in which the Board of Directors
65 See infra Section VI.
[Vol 4:2
KESAN & GALLO
would be elected by direct vote from net-citizens. 66 In this scenario,
users would govern the Internet, without significant intervention by
national governments or the private sector. Accordingly, this
dimension of state versus private sector control constitutes the first
line of disagreement about the reforms.
The second area of disagreement involves the type of
representation ICANN should have. On one hand, private sector
representatives prefer a system of direct delegation from private firms
that design and manage the structure of the Internet through ICANN.
National governments who want to name delegates to ICANN's Board
also prefer this type of organization. On the other hand, Internet
users would like to participate more directly in the decision-making
process to institute friendlier policies for consumers and users.
As a result, the spectrum of debate for the upcoming changes in
ICANN structure mirrored these two dimensions (Figure 3). As we
can see, combining these two issues results in four different policy
spaces concerning regulation and delegation. In the first policy space
(I), we have a system in which the government creates the rules for
regulation, and the composition of the Board of ICANN is dictated by
direct representation from governments and other constituencies.
This system has a strong top-down regime, in which governments
would be influential, while the private sector and Internet users will
have a low participation.
66 See the following interview to Carl Auerbach, one of the elected ICANN board members
and vocal activist for a decentralized governance for ICANN, at
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/poliCy/2002/12/0 5 /karl.html.
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Figure 3. Policy Spaces
Top-Down Delegation















Under the second policy space of structure for ICANN (I), the
private sector dictates who will be in charge of defining and managing
the rules. ICANN representation would be chosen by direct delegation
from the constituencies. Such a system would reinforce the control of
proprietary interests in the policymaking process of ICANN. In this
case, governments and Internet users are excluded from the decision-
making process. In the third space (III), a system emerges in which
the government still defines the rules for regulating the Internet, but
representation is subject to a more democratic process. This would
allow users greater participation in the decision-making process, even
though their representatives would be operating under a regime
defined by government. Finally, in the fourth space (IV), a system
appears in which open democracy is applied to a bottom-up regulatory
regime. This type of regime would give more control to users and
their advocates. However, under this regime, neither national
governments nor the proprietary private sector would have enough
power to directly participate in the policymaking process, which
would make this system highly unstable.
Given the potential room for debate regarding the new structure of
ICANN, it is important to identify (1) the current ICANN structure, (2)
the proposed changes, and (3) the preferences of its constituencies.
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We analyzed (1) in Section III of this article, so we now turn to (2) the
proposed changes. By analyzing the preferences of each group, we can
determine the chances of success for the different reforms as well as
which groups will support a given reform. We consider two main
proposals for reform. First, there is the inside-out process of reform,
initiated by ICANN's President in 2002.67 Even though this process
looked like a simple consensual process to modify ICANN, it was an
attempt by ICANN's President to include more international
constituencies and, at the same time, maintain the private sector's
involvement on the Board. Second, the United Nations and the
International Telecommunications Union ("ITU") headed an outside-
in reform attempt in 2003 through the World Summit on the
Information Society. The reform can be understood as an attempt to
strip ICANN and the United States government of their monopoly of
domain names and numbers regulation and transfer it to an
international organization under the direct control of the United
Nations or the ITU. In the following Sections, we analyze these
proposed reforms in terms of our preferences model. We show how
the debate about Internet regulation is far from over and how it has
become more complex and political.
V. INSIDE-OUT REFORM: ICANN's PRESIDENT PROPOSAL
In February 2002, the President of ICANN proposed a set of
changes to the structure of ICANN, particularly with respect to how
the Board is composed and how the Directors are elected.68 The
President mentioned many factors that instigated the need for change:
ICANN is still not fully organized, and it is certainly not yet
capable of shouldering the entire responsibility of global
DNS management and coordination. ICANN has also not
shown that it can be effective, nimble, and quick to react to
problems. ICANN is overburdened with process, and at the
same time underfunded and understaffed. For these and
other more fundamental reasons, ICANN in its current form
has not become the effective steward of the global Internet's
naming and address allocation systems as conceived by its
founders. Perhaps even more importantly, the passage of
67 See LYNN, supra note 9; infra Section V.
68 LYNN, supra note 9.
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time has not increased the confidence that it can meet its
original expectations and hopes.69
This short paragraph summarizes the main problems ICANN faced
just two years after its foundation. Throughout ICANN, it was well
known that reform was needed. As for the direction of the changes,
the President stated the following:
I have come to the conclusion that the original concept of a
purely private sector body, based on consensus and consent,
has been shown to be impractical. The fact that many of
those critical to global coordination are still not willing to
participate fully and effectively in the ICANN process is
strong evidence of this fact. But I also am convinced that, for
a resource as changeable and dynamic as the Internet, a
traditional government approach as an alternative to ICANN
remains a bad idea. The Internet needs effective,
lightweight, and sensible global coordination in a few limited
areas, allowing ample room for the innovation and change
that makes this unique resource so useful and valuable.70
In this paragraph the President blames most of the failures of ICANN
to the pure bottom-up approach of its structure. As a result, he
advocates for a more active role for government, even when he is
reluctant to endorse a purely top-down approach. This proposal seems
to recognize a need to move toward a mixed system with cooperation
among national governments and the private sector.71  Having
advocated active participation from both public and private entities,
the President presented the newly proposed structure of ICANN for
debate.
The President's proposal was an ambitious plan to open ICANN
governance to other important Internet constituencies. In particular,
it offered an important role to foreign governments and relegated
some of the previous supporting organizations to an advisory position.
According to the President's proposal, the Board of Directors would be





than nineteen),72 (2) five nominated by national governments (one
from each geographic area),73 (3) five nominated by the Nominating
Committee and confirmed by the remaining Board of Trustees, 74 and
(4) five ex-officio trustees appointed by the President, the chairs of the
72 Id.
73 Id. ("a. Five (one from each ICANN geographic region) nominated by national
governments (process to be determined) and confirmed by the Board of Trustees.").
74 Id. b. Five nominated by open nominating process and confirmed by the Board of
Trustees:
i. Nominating Committee made up of: (a) nonvoting Chair, appointed by
ICANN CEO after wide consultation; (b) three Trustees whose terms
are not expiring; and (c) four other persons selected by the Board of
Trustees, after wide consultation.
2. Nominations process open to all suggestions and inputs, widely
publicized, with adequate time to do thorough work. The Nominating
Committee is expected to consult with a broad range of the ICANN
communities for input to its deliberations.
3. To assure open communications and substantive input from all major
stakeholders, there will be at least the following nonvoting liaisons to
the Nominating Committee: designees or representatives of TAB, IP
address registries, domain name registries and registrars, root name
server operators, and the immediately preceding chair of the
Nominating Committee.
4. Nominating Committee makes nominations based on well-defined
criteria, clearly stated in advance for each position: outstanding
professional accomplishment, technical understanding, record of
leadership, reputation for good judgment, record of public service,
independence and willingness to commit time and effort; all with due
regard for geographic diversity and differentiated experience objectives.
5. When making nominations to a particular Council, the Nominating
Committee will consult widely with the most affected stakeholder
communities. For example, in making nominations for the Address and
Numbering Steering Group, the Nominating Committee will consult
with the lAB, RIR Boards and staff, and ISPs.
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policy councils, and the Technical Advisory Committee chair.75 The
supporting organizations are eliminated and replaced by three policy
councils.76 These councils are the (1) Address and Numbering Policy
Council,77 (2) Generic TLD Names Policy Council,78 and (3)
Geographic TLD Names Policy Council.79 The new proposal considers
creating four new committees. The first two, the Government and
Technical Standing Advisory Committees, ° would advise the Board
on policy decisions. The second two, the Root Name Server
Operations Committee and the Security Committee, were more
technical in nature. Finally, an ombudsman was proposed to oversee
public comments and ensure the general transparency of the
operations (Figure 4).81 This proposal offered a simpler and more
manageable structure than the existing structure which is depicted in
Figure 2. The number of directors, now named trustees, would
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. ("The [Address and Numbering Policy Council] would essentially combine the
functions of the current PSO and ASO into a single body, with appropriate staff support
and a single Steering Group. The ANPC would have responsibility for advising the Board
on the very limited range of policy issues relating to IP address allocation, and any policy
or operational issues that arise in connection with ICANN's performance of the IANA
protocol numbering functions.").
78 Id. ("The GNPC would replace the current DNSO, again with appropriate staff and with
a Steering Group partly representing stakeholder groups and partially selected by the
Board of Trustees.").
79 Id. ("The ccNPC would be a new entity, intended to provide both policy advice to the
Board of Trustees where needed and to serve as a service and policy advisory body to the
243 ccTLDs. It would have appropriate staff support, and a Steering Group made up of
both ccTLD representatives and other persons with relevant knowledge or experience that
could contribute to these objectives.").
8oLYNN, supra note 9. The GAC should continue to be a forum for national governments to
discuss DNS policy issues, but should have appropriate staff support, and full membership
should require a funding contribution per some tiered schedule (requiring little or no
contribution from less developed nations). The GAC Chair would serve as an ex officio
liaison to the ICANN Board of Trustees .... The TAC will advise the ICANN Board and
staff on the technical aspects of ICANN's operational responsibilities. For example, the
TAC would be the body to provide advice on testing the use of shared addresses for the root
name servers, or for testing the ability to deploy internationalized TLDs in the root zone
file.
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decrease from nineteen to fifteen82 Furthermore, direct elections by
the at-large members would be eliminated and replaced with election
by national governments. 83
Figure 4. Proposed Change to ICANN Structure
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The proposed centralized structure increases Board power and,
therefore, makes Board representation crucial for the actors within
ICANN. The Councils created to replace the existing supporting
organizations would elect just one trustee each, instead of the current
three per supporting organization.8 4 Finally, the final five trustees
would be elected by the newly-created Nominating Committee,
composed of a nonvoting Chair appointed by the ICANN CEO, three
trustees whose terms do not expire, and four other members elected
by the Board of trustees. As a result, the Board of Trustees would have
strong control over the Nominating Committee.85
The seats on the Board were divided among national governments,
different private sectors (through the councils), and independent
trustees who would be elected by the Nominating Committee.
National governments and technical organizations would also have an
important role in advising the Board through two new advisory
committees and the two nonvoting liaisons in the Board.8 6 As a
consequence, this proposed structure of ICANN fosters stronger
involvement from both national governments and the private sector,
and less participation from independent Internet users who compose
the at-large membership. If one envisioned democratic
representation within ICANN that would allow users to vote and
directly participate, then this proposal took the opposite direction.
This proposal was widely discussed and criticized. In the end, the
bylaws approved were quite different from those envisioned by the
President's initiative. As we discuss in the next Section, the current
stakeholders in ICANN, who held a veto power over the proposed
changes, took the reform process in a different direction, one that
accorded better with their preferences.
A. CONSTITUENCIES' PREFERENCES SHAPE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Following our preferences model developed in Section III (Figure
3), Figure 5 shows the preference points for each group in the current
structure of ICANN. Each point in Figure 5 represents the system that
each constituency prefers for ICANN. The point labeled "ICANN"
represents the structure of ICANN before the proposal of 2002, i.e., a
private corporation relatively free from government intervention with





a quasi-direct system of delegation. The point labeled "President
Proposal" represents the preference point for the President, according
to the proposal he presented in early 2002. As indicated, this
proposal was intended to restructure ICANN, to allow more
participation from national governments and to reduce the direct
involvement of the private sector. However, the proposal did not try
to create an alternative democratic system for ICANN. The
preferences of the private constituencies of ICANN, particularly the
Address Supporting Organization ("ASO") and the Country Code Top
Level Domains ("ccTLDs"), are represented by a set of points labeled
with their names. These constituencies would prefer a system in
which ICANN policymaking is based on a bottom-up regime, with
little direct participation from users, i.e., a system controlled by the
private sector. As a consequence, they would strongly oppose the
reform proposed by the President. Finally, Internet users would
prefer a relatively decentralized system with little government
intervention but not completely controlled by proprietary interests.
At the same time, users would like to have open, democratic access to
the ICANN governing body.
To further elucidate each party's preference, given the current
make-up of ICANN, Figure 6 illustrates the politics of ICANN reform.
The point of intersection is labeled "ICANN" and is considered the
status quo, because it represents the current structure of ICANN
under debate. As in Figure 5, each point represents the preferred
regime for each constituency. The farther the status quo is from the
preference point of a given constituency, the lower the level of utility
that group receives from the current organization. Finally, the circle
for each constituency or group represents the preferred set of options
in the political space.
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Accordingly, all the points inside the circle are preferred over the
status quo, i.e., the current ICANN structure, since the distance from
the preferred point to any of the points inside the circle is shorter than
the distance to the status quo. For example, in the case of the
President, his bliss point represents the most preferred point, but he
would accept any reform that is within the circle, given that the
distance to its bliss point inside the circle is shorter than the actual
ICANN structure. Coalition among different constituencies can
happen in those areas where the preferred sets of two or more groups
coincide. Furthermore, a given constituency will not accept a reform
that lies outside its circle. In such a case, this group would be better
off with the current structure of ICANN.
Based on the distribution of preferences, we have made the
following inferences in our study. First, the President's proposal is far
from politically feasible since it is not part of the preferred set for the
majority of the Board. Second, the natural allies in this situation are
the DNSO and ASO groups since they prefer similar systems that are
totally decentralized from the government and their own delegates on
the Board. Third, these constituencies could reach an agreement with
ccTLD representatives. As a result, the most probable political
coalition that could be formed to successfully change ICANN is that
formed by the ccTLD, DNSO, and ASO constituencies.
The shaded area in Figure 7 shows the set of possible changes for
the structure of ICANN, in accord with the shared utility of the
political coalition described above. Considering this possible set of
results, the new structure of ICANN will likely give more policymaking
power to the private sector. Furthermore, it will then also reduce the
direct participation of users in the formation of the Board.
[Vol. 4:2
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B. POLITICAL DEBATE: THE FIGHT FOR REPRESENTATION
In March 2002, right after the President made his reform
proposal, the Board of Directors renamed the newly formed
Committee of Restructuring (created four months before, in
November 2001) the "Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform"
("ERC").8 7 The Committee examined the proposed changes and tried
to address the varying concerns of the different constituencies and
groups with an interest in how ICANN would function. As a result,
87 ICANN, Preliminary Report, Mar. 14, 2002, http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-
report-14maro2.htm.
20o8]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
the Committee provided the main platform upon which each of the
constituencies could voice their concerns and preferences.
In developing these recommendations, the ERC has listened
carefully to comments and suggestions of all segments of the
ICANN community-both written and verbal statements,
most of them public. We have considered and evaluated all
of the many constructive suggestions received by the ERC.88
Finally, in June 2002, the Committee published its proposal for
reform called A Blueprint for Reform.89 In this document, the
Committee elaborated on the President's proposal, introduced some
changes and requested the Board's approval.90 The structure of
ICANN envisioned in the Blueprint is shown in Figure 8.
90 Id.
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Figure 8. Blueprint Proposal by the ERC
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After extensive debate and bargaining, the ERC ended up with a
proposal that differed substantially from the President's.
In the Blueprint, the role of the government was reduced, even
though it is still more important than under the original governance
structure.91  Government representatives can be found in every
organization of ICANN. Nonetheless, the Blueprint eliminated some
of the more radical reforms proposed by the President. Political
pressure from different constituencies and organizations preserved
some of the old structure from reform.92 For example, the ASO and
91 Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform, 2002, Government Participation,
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform (last visited April 5, 208).
92 See infra Section VI.C.
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the General Name Supporting Organization (GNSO, formerly DNSO)
were reinstated in their previous form. Furthermore, the proposal left
open the possibility of a new arrangement among the Country Code
Top Level Domains, International Governments, and the ICANN
Board in order to create a new structure inside ICANN that would
better address the interests of ccTLDs.93
The creation of a new framework for ccTLDs, with a more active
role in ICANN, was a direct result of pressure from the country code
managers and from other countries to expand ICANN to the
international arena.94  The Protocol Advisory Organization was
eliminated, and its members were transferred to the Technical
Advisory Committee. One of the most important proposals involved
creating a more ambitious nominating committee, with nineteen
members coming from different constituencies and groups. 95 This
committee would have the power to name more than half of the
members of the Board (Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform,
2002a).
In summary, the proposal of the ERC seemed to reflect a
compromise between the extensive reforms proposed by the ICANN
President and the competing interests among the different
organizations and constituencies that have a stake in the current
structure and policymaking process of ICANN. In the next Sections,
we explore the debate between the ERC and the different
organizations and groups inside ICANN that led to its present Bylaws.
C. ORGANIZATIONS AND CONSTITUENCIES REACIONS
Both the proposal introduced by the President of ICANN and the
Blueprint delivered by the ERC to the Board, received many
comments and critiques from the different constituencies and
organizations that have an interest in the political process of ICANN.
In this Section, we summarize the positions of these groups with
respect to the reforms.
93 ICANN: A Blueprint to reform, supra note 88, at "Supporting Organizations.'
94 See infra Section VI.C.
95 There are 18 voting members, as the President of the board is a non-voting member. See
ICANN: A Blueprint for Reform, supra note 88.
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1. THE DEBATE WITH ADDRESS SUPPORTING
ORGANIZATION MEMBERS
The ASO members are the Regional Internet Registries ("RIR")
who manage addresses in their respective regions.96 In the proposed
reform by the President of ICANN, the role of these RIRs would be
strongly limited. First, it would eliminate the ASO, replacing it with a
council. Second, it would mix the former ASO members with the
Protocol Supporting Organization members. Third, the Nomination
Committee would appoint an Internet Engineering Task Force
("IETF") member to the Address Council. The IETF is an
international technical community "concerned with the evolution of
the Internet architecture and the smooth operation of the Internet."
Fourth, the proposed reform would reduce the number of directors
that the RIRs could elect. Fifth, the proposal advocated for similar
policies for all councils and organizations. Sixth, it created the
Technical Advisory Committee in which the RIRs were included.
Seventh, it proposed that the Technical Advisory Committee would
supervise the Internet Assigned Names Authority ("LANA") policies.97
These proposals were strongly rejected by all RIRs, who expressed
their disapproval in a submission to the ERC on June 20, 2002.98
They countered with their own proposal that would put the majority of
decision-making power into their hands. Not only would the ASO be
preserved, but IANA operational functions, i.e., maintaining the IANA
address registry, would be transferred to them. The ASO would also
undertake responsibility for the formal adoption of global RIR
policies. The role of the ICANN Board, therefore, would be to oversee
the ASO's actions, as the ASO would also take over the Board's
responsibility of evaluating and approving new RIRs. Given the
extent of their control, the RIRs would be willing to have only one
director that represents them on the Board.99 Thus, the RIRs
96 See also ICANN Address Supporting Organization, http://www.aso.icann.org/ (last
visited Apr. 5, 20o8) (giving general information about ASO composition, history, tasks
and proposals).
97 See LYNN, supra note 9.
98 See ICANN, Regional Internet Registry Joint Statement on ICANN Evolution and
Reform, http://www.ieann-org/committees/evol-reform/second-joint-rir-statement-
20jun02.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
99 Id.
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considered a future organization without the involvement of
ICANN.100
The counterproposal from the RIRs generated an answer from the
ERC, which supported some of the changes but strongly opposed
others.1°1 First, among the accepted changes was the preservation of
the ASO in its original form. Second, management of the ASO was left
completely to the RIRs without the introduction of an IETF member
by the Nominating Committee. Third, the ASO would elect two
directors to the ICANN Board. Fourth, the rules and policies for each
association would reflect the particular characteristics of its members.
Fifth, RIRs are not included in the Technical Advisory Committee nor
would this committee supervise IANA policies.
However, the ERC strongly rejected three of the RIRs'
requirements. First, address policies would stay in the ICANN Board
jurisdiction instead of being transferred to the ASO. Second, the
inclusion of new RIRs would be studied and decided by the ICANN
Board. Third, the Board's LANA policies would not be transferred to
the ASO.10 2
After this exchange of proposals, the RIRs responded in October
2002 with a Blueprint for Evolution and Reform of Internet Address
Management.103 In this proposal they persist with some of the ideas
rejected by the ERC. As a result, the ERC decided to leave the articles
regarding ASO activities open to further amendment as the debate
between the RIRs and the ERC continued.104 This debate concerning
the role of each organization in the policymaking of ICANN reflects
both the short life of ICANN as a recognized institution for managing
the Internet and its quest to maintain balance among the various
political demands of its members. Because ICANN is a new
corporation, the debates around policymaking and structure will
continue for some time.
100 See id. § 6. General Comment.
101 See ICANN, Update Regarding RIR Submissions, Sept. 16, 2002,
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/update-16sepo2.htm.
102 Id.
103 See ICANN, RIR Blueprint for Evolution and Reform of Internet Address Management,
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/joint-rir-blueprint-o9octo2.htm (last
visited Apr. 5, 2008).




2. THE CREATION OF A NEW SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION:
THE CASE OF ccTLDs
One of the changes supported by all constituencies of ICANN was
improving the relationship between ICANN and the country code
registries. Since the beginning of ICANN operations, ccTLD members
perceived that the DNSO was mostly concerned with Generic Top
Level Domain ("gTLD") issues and that the relationship between
ICANN and ccTLDs should be reinforced.105 Furthermore, the
number of ccTLDs grew at high rates during the 1990s and had an
important role in the process of the internationalization of the
Internet. As a result, once the reform of ICANN was proposed, the
initiative of the ccTLD constituency to be recognized as an
independent supporting organization was one of the first issues in the
reform agenda of the ERC. The step required to form a separate
organization was reaffirmed in the Montevideo meeting in September
and the Marina del Rey meeting in November of 2001.106
Nevertheless, the first proposal of ICANN reform presented by the
President in February 2002, fell short of recognizing the ccTLD
constituency as an independent group. 10 7
The important role of the ccTLD constituency was recognized in
the ERC proposal, which created a separate council, but limited its
capacity for action by delegating the formation of the council to a
steering group comprised mostly of members of the ICANN Board.
This council was allowed to name only one trustee.108 As a result the
ccTLD constituency reacted negatively to the President's proposal at
the March 2002 meeting in Accra, Ghana.1°9 A series of discussions
and debates between the ccTLD constituency and the ERC helped to
105 See ccTLD Constituency of ICANN, World Wide Alliance of Top Level Domain Names,
Communiqu6 from Stockholm Meeting, June 1, 2001,
http://www.dnso.org/constituency/cctld/docs/2ooo6o.ccTLDstockholm-
communique.html.
106 See ccTLD World Wide Alliance of Top Level Domain-names, Communiqu6 from
Montevideo Meeting, Sept. 2001, http://2o2.141.141.181/web/communiques/
gaciocom.htm.
107 See Palfrey, supra note 34.
io8 See ICANN, supra note 88, at § 3; LYNN, supra note 9.
lo9 See ccTLD, World Wide Alliance of Top-level Domain Names, Communiqu6 from Accra
Meeting, Mar. 13,2002, http://www.wwtld.org/communique/2002o313.ccTLDaccra.
communique.html.
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resolve some of the differences with respect to the final role of the
ccTLD constituency in ICANN. 110
As a result, in September 2002, the ERC created a Country Code
Names Supporting Organization ("ccNSO") Assistance Group in order
to generate a structure for the ccNSO and to help it reach an
agreement regarding the relationship between this new supporting
organization and ICANN. Since then, the ccNSO Assistant Group has
been working on forming a proposal that permits the ccNSO and
ICANN to agree on a common structure and policy.,', Still, in the new
bylaws passed on December 15, the ccNSO was expected to elect two
directors to the Board.112 During continuing discussions for the new
supporting organization, the ccNSO Assistant Group produced a set of
recommendations for the creation of the ccNSO in February 2003.113
Based on this report, and on the comments received from ccTLD
members, the ERC published a report on the creation and structure of
the ccNSO in April 2003.114 Finally, at the Montreal meetings, the
ccNSO was formed based on the recommendations of the
Committee.115 As a result, the new bylaws were amended, leading to
the formation of a ccNSO Council, one similar in structure to the other
supporting organizations.11 6
110 See ICANN, Links Concerning ICANN's 2002 Evolution and Reform Process,
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/links.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 20o8)
(listing all the documents and exchange of ideas with all the organizations and
constituencies participating of the reforms).
ill See ICANN, Fourth Status Report: Formation of ccNSO Assistance Group, supra note
104.
112 See ICANN, Bylaws, Dec. 15, 2002, http://www.icann.org/general/archive-
bylaws/bylaws-i5deco2.htm.
113 See ICANN, ccNSO Assistance Group: Compiled Recommendations, Feb. 26, 2003,
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/ccnsoag-report-26febo3.htm.
114 See ICANN, ERC's Fifth Supplemental Implementation Report, Apr. 22, 2003,
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/fifth-supplemental-implementation-
report-22apro3.htm..
15 See ICANN, ICANN Montreal Meeting Topic: ccNSO Formation,
http://www.icann.org/montreal/ccnso-organization-topic.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).




As we can see in the debates regarding the role of ASO members
and the creation of the ccNSO,117 the reform process has not been
smooth. The bargaining and debate among the committees and the
many constituencies has been a long political process.11a  How
stakeholders will solve their differences will depend mostly on the
political strength of each party inside and outside ICANN. Other
constituencies, committees and Supporting Organizations also
expressed their ideas and proposals with respect to the reforms.19
The exchange of ideas, and the political pressure exerted on the
Board to impose certain constituencies' preferences, led to many
revisions of the President's original proposal and many revisions of
the ERC Blueprint. Although defining the relationships between the
ICANN Board and the groups that were part of ICANN was still a topic
of discussion, the Board of Directors approved the new modified
Bylaws in October 2002.120 After bargaining with ccNSO, the Board
approved a new set of Bylaws that included the structure and
functions of the new Supporting Organization.121 The structure of
ICANN was finally defined as shown in Figure 9. When comparing
this final structure of ICANN with the initial proposal from the
President (Figure 8) we find many differences. First, the role of the
government was reduced. 22 In the President's proposal, the
Government Advisory Committee ("GAC") was supposed to elect five
directors (1/3 of the total Board). In the final structure, GAC may not
elect even one director.123 Still, the role of national governments has
increased, as GAC now has more direct participation in all groups of
ICANN.124 Nonetheless, many countries left GAC or would not
117 See infra Fig. 9.
118 See ICANN, Bylaws, supra note 116, Art. IX.
119 See Appendix A for a description of the different points of view with respect to the
proposed reform.
120 See ICANN Board Meeting in Shanghai Real Time Captioning, Oct. 31, 2002,
http://www.icann.org/shanghai/captioning-31octo2.htm.
121 See ICANN, Bylaws, supra note 112.
122 Compare supra Fig. 8, with infra Fig. 9.
123 Id.
124 Wolfgang Kleinwachter, Beyond ICANN vs. ITU? How WSIS Tries to Enter the New
Territory of Internet Governance, 66 GAzETTE: THE INT'L J. FOR COMMS. STUD. 233, 233-
51, 2004.
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participate in GAC, as they felt that their voices were not heard.125
This prompted the international community to ask for a change in the
governance regime of ICANN.
Figure 9. Structure of ICANN in Accord with the Latest Bylaws
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125 Roman, supra note 39, at 6.
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On the whole, the reform process entered the realm of politics, and
different constituencies struggled to maintain, and enhance, their
power. The resulting reform produced several new characteristics.
First, the greater presence of GAC members in all ICANN
organizations permits a higher degree of communication between the
private sector and national governments.126 As a result, even if ICANN
is still a corporation with a strong bottom-up approach to regulating
the Internet, there is a movement toward a more cooperative stance
with national governments. 127 Second, the role of the ccTLDs was
increased by creating a new supporting organization, the ccNSO, to
represent them.12 8
This marks an opportunity for international cooperation and a
more active role for the international community in ICANN policies.
Third, the final reform proved advantageous for ASO and GNSO, both
of which avoided being transformed into advisory councils without
representation in the Board, because both groups are now protected
by electing two directors each, instead of one each.129 Furthermore,
both councils participate in the Nominating Committee and have the
chance to influence the election of the other eight directors.130 Fourth,
the Protocol Supporting Organization ("PSO") was eliminated both in
the first proposal and in the final bylaws. 31 This means a loss of
power for the technical organizations that took part in the political
structure of the first ICANN and whose role is reduced to that of
advisors to the Board. Fifth, the at-large community lost ground and
was left with a newly created At-Large Advisory Committee
("ALAC").32 Although ALAC can elect five delegates to the
Nominating Committee, the Nominating Committee represents many
other constituencies besides the at-large members.133 It seems that
through the bargaining process, those organizations and
126 ICANN, Bylaws, supra note 112.
127 See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 4, at 1497.
32 See ICANN, Bylaws, supra note 116.
129 See id. Arts. VIII, X.
130 Id.
131 See ICANN, Bylaws, supra note 112.
132 Id.
133 See id. Art. XI, §§ 2, 4.
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constituencies, which were better represented and structured than the
at-large community, undermined the initial powers given to at-large
members in the first reform proposal.134
As we can see, the reform of ICANN is an example of a political
process operating to reach a consensus and maintain equilibrium of
power within an organization. From this analysis, we conclude that
ICANN is not only a technical organization concerned with the
technical management of Internet addresses and numbers, but also a
political organization with the power to create policies for the
functioning of the Internet domain name system. Furthermore,
ICANN is now definitively a political body with different
constituencies holding a stake in its policies. In the next Section, we
analyze the result of this political struggle for reform.
D. WINNERS AND LOSERS:
THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AFrER REFORM
As in any reform, some groups are better positioned than others to
profit from the changes. The political bargaining described in the
previous Section demonstrates the political characteristics of ICANN.
We can identify the winners and losers by comparing the previous
structure of ICANN with the final reform. In Table 1, we calculate the
influence of each group and constituency over the Board of Directors
as the share of influence they have on the composition of the Board.135
We recognized the percentage of the number of seats in the Board
elected by each group or constituency as a proxy for the power of this
group inside ICANN. This percentage indicates the relative power of
each group as compared with the others. As we can see, the winners
from the reform have been the GNSO and ccTLD constituencies. Even
though now the GNSO constituencies elect only two directors by
themselves, as compared with three directors previously, they have a
greater influence on the Nominating Committee, which elects eight
more directors.
134 See Palfrey, supra note 34.
135 See infra Appendix (explaining the methodology employed in the creation of this table).
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Table 1. Relative Political Strength of Different ICANN Constituents
(As Probability of Electing a Director to the Board)
Before
Reform After Reform % Change
Director 5.26 6.67 26.7
GNSO (ex DNSO)() 15.79 33.19 145.2
Business 2.26 7.68 240.4
Non-Commercial 2.26 4.54 101.3
gTLD Registries 2.26 5.94 163.5
Registrars 2.26 5.94 163.5
ISPs 2.26 4.54 101.3
Intellectual Property 2.26 4.54 101.3
ASO 15.79 16.47 4.3
ARIN 3.95 4.12 4.3
RIPE NCC 3-95 4.12 4.3
APNIC 3.95 4.12 4.3
LACNIC 3-95 4.12 4.3




Members(*) 26.32 15.69 -40.4
At-Large
Constituencies 26.32 10.5 -6o.3
Africa 5.26 2.09 -60.3
Latin America 5.26 2.09 -60.3
North America 5.26 2.09 -60.3
Asia/Aust/Pac 5.26 2.09 -60.3
Europe 5.26 2.09 -6o.3
Non Elected (Initial
Board) 21.1 0 -100.0
Academic and others o 3.14
PSO (..) 15.79 5.49 -65.2
IETF 3.95 3.14 -20.5
W3C 3.95 0.78 -8o.1
ITU-T 3.95 0.78 -8o.1
ETSI 3.95 0.78 -8o.1
IAB 0.78
Total 100.00 100.00(.)
Source: Own elaboration based on ICANN bylaws.
Notes: (*) Includes the index value corresponding to the ccTLD Constituency.
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(**) In the old bylaws the At-Large Advisory Committee did not exist, but
we related it to the Directors elected by the broad constituencies in each
region. Under the new bylaws the elected at-large members come from the
At-Large Advisory Committee members representing each RALO and the
members elected by the Nominating Committee to the ALAC.
(***) PSO was eliminated in the new bylaws. We are relating this index to
the influence the members of the new Technical Liaison Group ("TLG") have
in naming Board Directors through the Nominating Committee.
(****) This total can be obtained by two procedures: first, by summing up
all the subtotals for each group (not in bold numbers) plus the subtotal for
ccNSO. Second, by summing up the subtotals for the Director, ASO, GNSO,
CCNSO, Elected At-Large Member, Academic and Others, PSO, IAB and the
influence of the Nominating Committee in the GNSO (see Apendix B).
Inside the GNSO, our calculations demonstrate that the reform
favored private businesses, which compose the only constituency
sending two delegates to the Nominating Committee (one
representative of small businesses and the other of large businesses).
The reform favors constituencies of the gTLD registries and registrars,
who receive more voting power inside the GNSO Council. Finally,
Internet Service Providers ("ISP"), Intellectual Property, and Non-
Commercial Constituencies improved their situation but to a lesser
extent than those entities previously mentioned. The reform
primarily favors the ccTLD constituency, whose influence inside
ICANN has improved substantially.
The groups that lost the most power and influence in ICANN are
the at-large constituencies, elected by Internet users, and the technical
organizations, members of the former Protocol Supporting
Organization ("PSO"). Previously, at-large members could elect at
least five directors through democratic elections among Internet
users. Now they are represented by only five of the seventeen
representatives on the Nominating Committee. Furthermore, these
five representatives are elected by ALAC, in which the Regional At-
Large Organizations ("RALO") can elect just two representatives each.
The Nominating Committee elects the other five members of ALAC.
As a result, the direct participation of Internet users in the election of
ICANN Directors has been diluted through a series of mechanisms
and committees.
PSO members were downgraded to serve an advisory role in
ICANN. The creation of the Technical Liaison Group ("TLG"), without
any formal structure and with the aim of giving advice to the Board on
specific issues, determined the fate of PSO members in the ICANN
government. The only direct influence these members have is through
a delegate from the TLG on the Nominating Committee. The only
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organization that could maintain some influence was the IETF, which
has a representative on the Nominating Committee, though it is not in
the TLG. Finally, the ASO slightly increased its power inside ICANN,
but overall experienced little change.
If we look at the influence of national governments in ICANN,
there is a greater role for the Government Advisory Committee.
However, this committee does not have any direct participation in the
policymaking process because national governments elect no
members of the Board. This result is far from the ambitious changes
initially proposed by the President. Consequently, the winners and
losers of this process are well described by our political model of
preferences, since the initial proposal by the President was steered
toward a regime closer to the preferences of ICANN's original
constituencies.
The reform proposed in early 2002 was far from ideal for the main
ICANN constituencies. As a result, the political influence of each of
these constituencies gave shape to the final reforms of ICANN. In the
end, most of the President's changes were overturned; instead,
reforms were instituted that favored the stakeholders with political
power in the decision-making process (Figure 10). The final result has
been detrimental to the direct participation of Internet users and the
technical organizations.
We can expect more direct policymaking, without a lesser
dispersion of power. We can also expect more political decisions
because the private sector with political interests in the Internet now
has a more important role, and national governments are also taking a
more active stance. Finally, as ICANN becomes more international,
we should expect better enforcement of its policies throughout the
Internet, especially from ccTLDs with greater Board power.
Nonetheless, we should not expect this structure to be stable, as
ICANN is an organization still in its formative stage. As the new
groups with more power begin to shape ICANN policies, new
constituencies will form and challenge the status quo. It is therefore
important to recognize the political nature of ICANN, as recent
reforms may anticipate how ICANN will develop.
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VI. OUTSIDE-IN REFORM: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PROPOSALS
The reform process failed to bring a more active role for national
governments that the President of ICANN sought, and in the end
reinforced the power of the groups already represented on the Board.
This result represented a major success for the private sector in
controlling ICANN, but also generated an outcry from the
international community, which was already opposed to the existing
structure of ICANN. In the end, the attempt by ICANN's President to




The opposition to ICANN can be traced to its inception and the
monopolization of the U.S.'s control of the contract with ICANN. This
initial opposition was one of the main factors that produced the
attempt at reform in 2002. As previously explained, ICANN's
President attempted to bring foreign governments into the decision
making process as an instrument to silence criticism. However, after
the reversal of the President's reform, the international community
reassessed its attacks on ICANN due to frustration resulting from the
reform process. Since the inception of ICANN in 1997, most countries
have envisioned the Internet as an international phenomenon that
transcends the frontiers of a country. A group of countries wanted to
transfer Internet governance to a United Nations intergovernmental
body, the International Telecommunication Union. 136
In this respect, the reform attempt by ICANN's President can be
seen as an attempt to bridge this gap. However, the final reform did
not satisfy developing countries 137 and it generated a withdrawal of
support for ICANN's Government Advisory Committee ("GAC") from
many countries as well as the ITU. The United Nations, through the
ITU, created a series of summits in 2003 called the World Summit on
the Information Society. Because Internet governance was an issue of
increasing importance, the United Nations created the Working
Group on Internet Governance 138 with the specific purpose of
analyzing the appropriate form for Internet Governance.139 The forty
members of WGIG14O held several meetings since 2003 in preparation
for the second phase of WSIS which occurred in Tunis in November
2005. The approach of WGIG with respect to Internet governance,
specifically ICANN, is based on a top-down approach in which
national governments are in charge of the regulatory system.141 This
136 See Kleinwachter, supra note 124, at 230-241.
137 LYNN, supra note 9; ICANN, Links Concerning ICANN's 2002 Evolution and Reform
Process, supra note 10.
138 Don MacLean, A Brief Story of WGIG, in REFORMING INTERNET GOVERNANCE:
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WORKING GROUP ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE (WGIG) 10 (William
J. Drake ed., 2005), available at http://www.wgig.org/docs/book/WGIGbook.pdf.
139 WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance, 3,
http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
140 MacLean, supra note 138, at 11.
'4' Markus Kummer, Introduction, in REFORMING INTERNET GOVERNANCE: PERSPECTIVES
FROM THE WORKING GROUP ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE (WGIG) 1 (William J. Drake ed.,
2005).
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approach is in striking contrast to the regulatory model ICANN,
supported by the United States government, has been
implementing.142
In preparation for the 2005 WSIS, the WGIG held four meetings
in 2004 and 2005.143 In the last meeting, the Working Group
produced a report delineating an approach for Internet governance,
specifically with respect to ICANN.144 The WGIG defined Internet
governance as "the development and application by Governments, the
private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and
programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet."145
This vision of Internet governance, with national governments as
the main source of rules and regulations, contrasts with the ongoing
definition by ICANN stakeholders and the United States government
of a bottom-up, private-sector led regulatory regime.4 6  The
preeminence of a top-down approach is apparent when the WGIG
outlines the role of national governments with respect to Internet
Governance:
" Public policymaking and coordination and
implementation, as appropriate, at the national
level, and policy development and coordination at
the regional and international levels;
* Creating an enabling environment for information
and communication technology ("ICT")
development;
* Oversight functions;
" Development and adoption of laws, regulations and
standards;
142 MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT, supra note 6.
143 The four meetings of the WGIG were held in Geneva on: November 23-25, 2004;
February 14-18, 2005; April 18-20, 2005; and June 14-17, 2005. See World Summit on
the Information Society, www.wsis.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2oo8).
144 See WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance, supra note 139.
145 Id.




* Development of best practices;
" Fostering capacity-building in and through ICTs;
* Promoting research and development of
technologies and standards;
* Promoting access to ICT services;
" Combating cybercrime;
" Fostering international and regional cooperation;
* Promoting the development of infrastructure and
ICT applications;
* Addressing general development issues;
* Promoting multilingualism and cultural diversity;
and
" Dispute resolution and arbitration.147
As we can see, the extent of government's role in Internet
governance under this vision is much enhanced when compared to
that provided by the GAC of ICANN. In the case of names and
numbers, the role of national governments was to provide advice and
oversight of ICANN's Board decisions, while under the WGIG report,
national governments are in charge of the governance system.
In accord with this definition of Internet governance and the
government's role in it, the WGIG proposed the creation of an
organizational form for the governance of the Internet, under the
following general principles:
* No single government should have a pre-eminent
role in relation to the international Internet
governance;
147 WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance, supra note 139, at 8-9.
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* The organizational form for the governance function
will be multilateral, transparent and democratic,
with the full involvement of Governments, the
private sector, civil society and international
organizations; and
* The organizational form for the governance function
will involve all the stakeholders and relevant
intergovernmental and international organizations
within their respective roles.148
In the case of names and numbers, these principles imply the end
of United States control of ICANN and the transfer of these activities
to a multilateral organization, modeled closely after the United
Nations. This indeed implies a purer top-down regulatory regime as
opposed to the bottom-up approach of ICANN.
Furthermore, the WGIG proposed four different models for such
organization. These models included, in some form or another, the
tasks currently performed by ICANN. An analysis of these models
provides useful insights into the international debate regarding
Internet governance and the alternative models to ICANN.
The first model proposed the creation of a Global Internet Council
("GIC") with members from the national governments of each
region. 149 The main objective of the GIC was to overtake the function
of the U.S. Department of Commerce with respect to ICANN (Figure
11).150
148 Id. at 12.
149 See Abdullah A. Al-Darrab, The Need for International Internet Governance Oversight,
in REFORMING INTERNET GOVERNANCE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTERNET GOVERNANCE (WGIG) 178 (William J. Drake ed., 2005), available at
http://www.wgig.org/docs/book/WGIG-book.pdf (explaining that Model i was the one
that many in the WGIG believed to be the most appropriate for Internet governance).
150 Id. at 181-82.
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Figure i. Proposal Creation of Global Internet Council
United Nations
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Setting international Internet public policy and providing
the necessary oversight relating to Internet resource
management (root zone file, IP addresses, gTLDs,
ccTLDs)
" Setting of international public policy and coordination
for other Intemet-related key issues (spare, privacy,
cybersecurity and cyberorime)
" Facilitating negotiation of treaties, conventions and
agreements on Internet-related public policies
" Fostering and providing guidance on certain
development issues in the Internet agenda (capacity
building, multilingualism, equitable and cost-based
international interconnection costs, and equitable access
for all)
* Approving rules and procedures for dispute resolution
mechanisms and conduct arbitration
The GIC will accomplish most of the tasks regarding Internet
governance and ICANN will depend on the GIC, as it now depends on
the United States government. In this regime, the private sector and
civil society will be relegated to an advisory role without any power in
the decision-making process.15 1 Finally, the GIC would depend on the
United Nations.152 As a result, this model represents a strong
departure from the current system to a top-down regime controlled by
a multinational body.
The second model proposed a significantly minor reform of
ICANN. According to this proposal, there is no need for a specific
organization, but the current regime could continue operating under
the same rules. However, it proposes to change the Government
Advisory Committee of ICANN in order to take into account the
preferences of all countries.153 In this new forum, national
governments could participate, debate different policy proposals, and
recommend specific courses of action. However, this new forum
151 Id. at 18o.
152 Id. at 182.
153 WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance, supra note 138, at 14.
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would not have any power to implement these policies. This proposal
seems minor compared to the previous one, and it resembles the
proposal made by ICANN's President in 2002. l54
The third model proposes a departure from the current system in
line with the first model (Figure 12). This model proposes the creation
of an International Internet Council (IIC), which would assume the
current role of the United States in the governance of ICANN. The IIC
would replace ICANN's GAC with the private sector and civil society
as advisory bodies.
Figure 11. Proposal Creation of Global Internet Council
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Finally, the fourth model also proposes a departure from the
current system, but envisions the creation of three different
organizations to handle three main governance issues:
* Public policy development and decision-making on
international Internet-related public policy issues
led by Governments;
* Oversight over the body responsible at the global
level for the technical and operational functioning of
the Internet led by the private sector; and
" Global coordination of the development of the
Internet through dialogue between Governments,
the private sector and civil society on an equal
footing.155
154 See supra Section III.
155 WGIG, Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance, supra note 138, at 15.
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The first organization proposed is the Global Internet Policy
Council ("GIPC"), which would be led by the government with the
private sector and the civil society participating as advisors. The
second organization is the World Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ("WICANN"), which is similar to the current
ICANN but led by the international private sector and linked to the
United Nations (Figure 13).
Figure 13. Proposal Creation of WICANN
In this case, the Oversight Committee, appointed and controlled
by the Global Internet Council ("GIC"), will have the same role the
United States government currently has with respect to ICANN. This
new organization will be linked to the United Nations. National
governments will also have an advisory role through GAC, as they do
under the current ICANN. Finally, civil society will participate through
an advisory role.
The third organization is the Global Internet Governance Forum("GIGF") which will be a forum for national governments, the private
sector and civil society to facilitate the coordination and debate of
public policy issues.156
156 Id. at 16.
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These models for Internet governance signify a strong departure
from the bottom-up regime of ICANN and a transfer of control from
the United States to the United Nations or another international
organization. These proposals were considered in the 2005 WSIS.
The United States and ICANN rejected this sweeping reform,157 while
most developing countries and even the European Union supported
some departure from the current regime.158 In the end, the United
States' position prevailed and ICANN was saved. However, the WSIS
approved the creation of an Internet Governance Forum ("IGF"),
which should evaluate future policies and governance regimes for the
Internet.59 The IGF is given a wide spectrum of policy issues to
consider,160 but its role is limited to an advising organization. The
document clearly specifies that the IGF is not intended to have any
"oversight function and would not replace existing arrangements,
mechanisms, institutions and organizations, but would involve them
and take advantage of their expertise. It would be classified as a
neutral, non-duplicative and non-binding process. It would have no
involvement in day-to-day or technical operations of the Internet."161
This clause seems to protect ICANN from being replaced by an
international institution, but it also leaves the possibility that the IGF
can recommend to replace ICANN in the future.162
As a result, the future of ICANN looks uncertain, not just because
of the internal struggle for power, but also because of the opening of
Internet governance to the international arena, where national
governments have a stronger say than the private sector.
Furthermore, we have two incommensurable approaches to Internet
governance. On one hand, we have a hands-off approach promoted by
the United States through its contract with ICANN. 63 This approach
157 Kleinwachter, supra note 124, at 223.
158 See ICANN COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTERNET
GOVERNANCE (2005), http://www.icann.org/announements/ICANN-WGIG-report-
comments-15augo5.pdf.
159 See WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, World Summit on the Information
Society, Nov. 18, 2005, at 11, http://www.itu.int/wsis/ docs2/tunis/off/6revt.pdf.
16o Id. at 11.
161 Id. at 12.
162 Id. at 1O.
163 See supra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
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pushes for a continuation of the current regime, which in turn gives
the United States a monopoly over the control and oversight of
ICANN. The European Union supports this hands-off approach, but
prefers the United States to step down as the government in charge of
ICANN activities. 164
On the other hand, the top-down approach of the WGIG,
promoted by developing countries, implies a multilateral approach
with direct control of Internet governance by the government.' 65 Note
that this preferred point represents the sentiment of the majority of
the members of WGIG and country participants of WSIS, because
some countries, like the United States, prefer to continue the
decentralized system. 66 Figure 14 shows where the proposed reform
by the international community ranks with respect to the changes
introduced by ICANN. As we demonstrate, the initial proposal by the
President tried to engage government in a greater degree in ICANN's
decision-making process, but failed. In the end, the reform process
gave way to a system with a higher degree of participation from
ICANN stakeholders and with more participation from national
governments, albeit at an advisory level. However, the WGIG does
propose a dramatic change to Internet governance by giving national
governments a much bigger role.
164 Viviane Reding, ICANN? WeAll Can, WALL ST. J., Nov.16, 2005, at A18.
16s John Miller & Christopher Rhoads, U.S. Fights to Get Control of Global Internet
Oversight, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2005, at B2.
166 Kleinwachter, supra note 124, at 221.
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As for voting under a democratic versus a delegate system, there is
evidence, as shown throughout the article, that direct democracy by
Internet users has lost any chance of survival. Furthermore, under the
WGIG proposal, the system would move toward a stronger delegation
system, internally democratic, in the sense that more countries will
have more influence on regulatory issues, but externally un-
democratic due to the nature of representative selection for each
sector; this is even more important in the case of the WGIG regime.
As a result, we have a classical confrontation between a top-down
approach and a bottom-up approach for governing the Internet. As
previously analyzed, these different positions were clearly discussed
during the WSIS meeting in Tunis, where the international
community decided to maintain ICANN and the current system under
the control of the United States. However, this decision is not
definitive, and the newly created Internet Governance Forum could
shift the system to a more top-down regime in the future. As a result,
an unstable situation still exists; the international community is trying
to propose an alternative to ICANN, which currently maintains the
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control of the Domain Name System with the support of the United
States.
A. THE WORLD INTERNET GOVERNANCE ORGANIZATION
Given the tension between ICANN and the United Nations, we
suspect that this transition could be moved forward by the creation of
a supranational entity in charge, not only of ICANN's existing
responsibilities, but also of other areas related to the Internet, i.e., e-
commerce, Internet security. We call this organization the World
Internet Governance Organization ("WIGO"); it would be managed by
a board representing the developed countries and the technical groups
with a stake in the Internet. This would entail the creation of an
institution organized somewhere in between the unilateral regime
represented by ICANN and the multilateral approach proposed by the
United Nations. In order to succeed in such an enterprise, WIGO
should follow the example of other international organizations, like
the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), and build Internet
governance around well-defined technical and regulatory rules that
foster the economic and social development of this space. In this case,
instead of trying to build an organization based on the consensus of all
countries with a stake on the system, developed countries should rely
on the technical advice of organizations, public and private, with a
stake in the Internet. Based on these general guidelines, countries
would be offered incentives to participate in this system, for example,
through economic gains or the availability of a seal of quality. In
exchange, countries would adhere to the international norms
regulating the Internet and provide secure access to their respective
domain names.
Figure 15 shows how an organization like WIGO will fit among the
established preferences of the involved actors. In this respect, WIGO
could strike a compromise between the U.S., which will not debate the
power of governance without clear rules, and the UN. WIGO would
allow both parties to obtain some of their objectives. The U.S. would
retain some power to design the system, while other developed and
developing countries would have more say in the direction of the
system. A well-thought proposal that considers the foremost needs of
the Internet will have a greater chance of succeeding than individual
attempts to overtake over the governance of the Internet.
Furthermore, WIGO will generate a point of convergence for the
diverse preferences of international stakeholders such as national
governments, the private sector and consumers. Nonetheless, the
success of such a proposal requires countries to realize that
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unorganized or individual attempts to regulate the Internet will not
carry the day.
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The United States created ICANN to promote international
cooperation with regard to Internet governance, based on a bottom-up
system in which government intervention was limited, if not
eliminated. However, as the Internet has become a global
phenomenon, this initiative has faced increasing opposition from the
international community. Despite the initial arguments to the
contrary posed by the U.S. government and ICANN's creators, the
evolution of ICANN, a process wherein all groups and constituencies
try to impose their preferences, reveals its political nature. During the
reform movement initiated internally in ICANN, different
111 ~I . i
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constituencies tried to exploit the situation by gaining power positions
in the new structure. The political strength of different groups and
constituencies reversed some of the initial reforms and produced a
totally new structure. The international community challenged
ICANN's internal reform attempt because the results of this reform
did not satisfy its preferences. The International community
concentrated its efforts on changing the primary structure of ICANN
from a private regulatory entity into a multilateral organization
controlled by international governments and removing the direct
control of ICANN from the United States government. In the end,
even though the proposals seem to look for different structures to
regulate domain names and numbers on the Internet, they represent a
political struggle between opposing points of view.
Among the results of our analysis, we can highlight the following:
first, as a result of the reform process, the private sector consolidated
its political position in the ICANN structure, at least in the short-run.
With the new bylaws, the private sector retained some of the power it
had before, and even gained more power. Among the winners of the
reforms are: the GNSO constituencies, which gained important power
spaces in the new design; ASO members, which had some gains, but
more importantly are still debating their future with the potential for a
more expansive relationship with ICANN; and the ccNSO, which was
recognized as an independent supporting organization. However, the
inside-out attempt to reform proved to be weak because it failed to
bring outside constituencies into the governance body and provided
additional fuel the already strong opposition from the international
community.
First, the inside-out reform analysis allowed us to examine the
political strength of ICANN's different constituencies. This process
also showed the important role of ICANN as a political instrument
rather than technical corporation. An indication of this is the fact that
most of the debate on the reform was based on how to divide the
power inside ICANN, more specifically inside the Board of Directors,
and how to maximize the capacity of each group to enforce their
policies.
Second, our analysis shows how the inside-out reforms sought to
enhance international cooperation. Creating a supporting
organization for the ccNSO and the incentives for international
governments to participate in a better CGA opened the ICANN's gates
to more extensive international participation in policymaking.
However, these attempts were not enough to satisfy the international
community; it did not respond to the reform with approval and
instead tried to generate its own model for Internet domain names
governance.
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The response of the international community to the regulatory
regime of ICANN was the creation of a new organization with
international ties controlled by national governments. This proposal,
as summarized in the WGIG report, sought to overhaul ICANN and
take away the United States' direct control of ICANN and the
management of names and numbers on the Internet. As a result, we
face a struggle between two different types of regulation-a bottom-up
approach with more participation from the private sector, and a top-
down approach that intends to take Internet governance into the
international arena.
Internet governance has become a hot political issue, and the
organizations in charge of managing the regulatory regime will reflect
these political preferences. The effectiveness of any of these
governance regimes will depend on how well the specific structure of
power provides an opportunity for consensus. In the end, the reform
and political struggle surrounding it have unmasked the political
nature of ICANN. As a result, ICANN's future will depend on the
consensus of its constituents and on the struggle between public and
private sectors. In this debate, the United States government is one of
the only governments defending ICANN in its current state because of
the contract that ties ICANN directly to the U.S. Department of
Commerce. In response, the international community is pushing the
U.S. to hand over its sole control of ICANN.
In light of the tension between both parties, we believe that
ICANN governance could move forward through the creation of a
supranational entity in charge of not just ICANN's responsibilities, but
also of other areas related to the Internet, i.e., Internet security. We
call this organization the World Internet Governance Organization.
WIGO would be managed by a board representing the developed
countries and the technical groups with a stake in the Internet. This
would entail an institution organized somewhere in between the
unilateral regime represented by ICANN and the multilateral
approach proposed by the United Nations.
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APPENDIX
The methodology for the construction of the Index for Distribution
of Power is as follows:
First, we measured the influence of each constituency according to
the old structure of ICANN (beginning of 2002). This influence is
represented by the percentage of seats on the Board that each
constituency elects. For example, the DNSO elected 3 Directors to a
Board of 19 Seats. Accordingly, the relative power of the DNSO is
calculated as 3/19=15.8. The DNSO is formed by 7 different
constituencies. Each constituency has a vote. For the Business
constituency, the power of electing a Board member is 15.8/7=2.26.
All the other values were calculated accordingly.
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Table Ai: ICANN Political Distribution of Power (Old Bylaws)
Political
Weight in the Strength
Board of particular
nstituency Directors Directors groups






























































Second, we measured the same index after the reform.
Accordingly, those groups that are favored by the reform would have
more direct decision-making in the naming of Board members. It is
important to mention that we considered the representation of each
constituency in the Nominating Committee multiplied by the
percentage of directors the Nominating Committee elects as further
evidence of each constituency's direct influence on the Board of
Directors. The methodology of calculating the percentages, or
political strength, is the same as in Table Al.







































Table A2: New Regime
































Table A2: New Regime (continued)
Weight in Board of
Directors Directors
gLTD
Registry
GNSO
Registrars
GNSO
CCNSO
ISP GNSO
IP GNSO
ASO
ARIN
RIPE NCC
APNIC
LACNIC
Academic
and others
Non
Commercial
GNSO
IETF
ICANN TLG
W3C
ITU-T
ETSI
LAB
Total 100.0
Political Strength
Particular Groups
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.1
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
3.1
3.1
3.1
3.1
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
100.0
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Total 100.0

